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REMARKS

Humanitarian Intervention: Evolving Norms,
Fragmenting Consensus
ROSA BROOKS†
INTRODUCTION
Thank you very much. It’s terrific to be here, and thanks to all of
you who have worked so hard to make this event come about.
In many ways, all of the speakers here today are telling different
versions of the same story—we’re all trying to describe the same set
of phenomena as we contemplate the ways in which norms about
humanitarian intervention have both evolved and been challenged
over the last 20 or so years.
Most of you here today have taken international law, and as you
know, every introductory international law course talks about the
sources of international law. Specifically, you spend some time
talking about customary international law, or CIL. Again, as you
know, to determine the contours of customary international law, we
normally look both to state practice and to “opinio juris”: that is, the
degree to which states are acting in a certain way out of a sense of
legal obligation, rather than out of mere habit or convenience.1
Traditionally, the evolution of customary international law was
understood as a gradual process: in some idealized model, we might
see first a few states, and then a few more, implicitly agreeing to
follow a practice, and then we would gradually begin to see
additional states doing the same thing.2 We would also gradually
†

Rosa Brooks is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center
and a Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation.
1. DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE 4(h) INTERVENTION 24 (2011).
2. See Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J.
INT’L L. 662, 665–67 (1953) (discussing the development of international law and
the competing elements of “usage” (patterned actions) and opinio juris).
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accumulate evidence that these various states are engaging in this
practice because they consider themselves legally bound to do so.
Then, over time, we’ll see more and more states following suit both
in word and deed, until at some point we can say with a great deal of
confidence that such and such has evolved into a binding norm of
customary international law.
That’s the idealized process through which norms of customary
international law develop. In real life, of course, it’s rarely so neat
and tidy. In fact, much of the time, the evolution of customary
international law looks less like a gradual, trouble-free emergence of
consensus than a continual process of contestation—a continual
process of resistance and conflict between states, if you will. By
“conflict” I don’t necessarily mean armed force, but rather diplomatic
conflict of all sorts: dueling demarches, dueling public statements,
and so on.
Norms relating to humanitarian intervention offer a typical
example. We are in a period in which we are seeing a norm relating
to humanitarian intervention struggling to emerge, if you will, but
that process of norm emergence is not a smooth one, has not been a
smooth one, and is unlikely to be a smooth one in the future. Indeed,
when we think about norms related to humanitarian intervention or
the Responsibility to Protect, if anything what we have seen has been
a process of reaction, counter-reaction, counter-counter-reaction and
counter-counter-counter-reaction. We are still going through that
cycle.
I’ll talk a little bit later about how and where this process might
end, but for now, let me say a little bit more about that cycle of
reaction and counter-reaction. Let me start by offering an extremely
abbreviated history of the last two decades of debate about
humanitarian intervention.
Start in the 1990s. The beginning of the 1990s marked the end of
the Cold War, and around the world, political leaders, activists, and
scholars struggled to predict how the Security Council’s role might
change with the Cold War deadlock finally broken.3 With the

3. For example, some scholars worried that the unrestrained, interpretive power
of the Security Council would be used by the Permanent Five members to
determine when and how to intervene at their discretion, rather than when it was
needed. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the UN Security Council in
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omnipresent Cold War threat of a nuclear conflict between the Soviet
Union and the United States finally over, the threat of proxy conflicts
between states aligned with one or the other superpowers also
appeared to come to an end.4
But even as the threat of inter-state conflict appeared to recede
when the Cold War ended, the world began to experience what
looked like a resurgence of messy internal conflicts within states,
exemplified by the ethnic conflicts Rwanda and Bosnia.5 During the
1994 Rwandan genocide, the international community stood by while
nearly a million people were slaughtered in a matter of a few short
months.6 In Bosnia the situation was not quite as shameful for the
international community, which did ultimately act—with Security
Council approval—to end the conflict, but most critics felt that the
international community did too little, too late.7 The conflict in the
Balkans brought concentration camps back to Europe for the first
time since World War II. 8 The conflict also brought massacres back
to Europe: during the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, for instance, an
estimated 8,000 unarmed civilians were slaughtered over a few short
days. 9
The glaring inadequacy of the international community’s
response to the crises in Rwanda and Bosnia led to a good deal of
hand-wringing, and an understandable and appropriate sense of
Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in
the Post-Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 12–13 (1994).
4. Francis M. Deng, The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement, 5 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 141, 154 (2001).
5. See generally CAROL MCQUEEN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
SAFETY ZONES: IRAQ, BOSNIA AND RWANDA 51–122 (2005) (providing background
on the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda and evaluating the international response to
these events).
6. See id. at 96–122 (evaluating the lack of an international response to the
conflict in Rwanda); see also JOSHUA J. KASSNER, RWANDA AND THE MORAL
OBLIGATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 1–4 (2013) (providing background
information on the Rwandan genocide).
7. See generally Amy Lou King, Bosnia-Herzegovina–Vance-Owen Agenda
for Peaceful Settlement: Did the U.N. do Too Little, Too Late, to Support this
Endeavor? 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347 (1993) (criticizing U.N. action in
Bosnia).
8. See generally Alan C. Laifer, Never Again? The “Concentration Camps” in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Abuses, 2 NEW EUR. L.
REV. 159 (1994) (describing both the events of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict
and the presence of concentration camps in the region).
9. Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica, BBC (June 9, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/675945.stm.
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guilt.10 The general sense was that the international community—led
by the UN Security Council—should have done more, or at least
should have done something, or really anything in the case of
Rwanda.11 Political leaders, the media and advocacy groups all
asked: Can it possibly be the case that it’s acceptable, legally or
morally, for the world to stand by idly while mass atrocities are
committed? In particular, when mass atrocities are committed
against a population by its own government?
We come next to the Kosovo crisis in 1998 and 1999. This has
already been the subject of much discussion today, so I won’t go into
detail. As evidence mounted of a renewed ethnic cleansing campaign
in Kosovo, it became clear that the Security Council would not
authorize the use of military force to end Serbian ethnic cleansing
activities.12 As you know, this was due to veto threats from China and
Russia, which were driven in part because of broad concerns about
shoring up norms of sovereign non-intervention, and—on Russia’s
end—by the historical alliances between Russian and the Serbian
authorities.13 This time, however, the rest of the international
community was unwilling to let Security Council inaction be the end
of the story. Despite the lack of Security Council authorization—and
anxious not to see another Rwanda or Bosnia—the NATO states

10. See Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide
in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY 49, 51–57 (Eric Stover & Harvey M.
Weinstein eds. 2004) (outlining the problems with the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, as well as the inadequacy of the international community’s
response).
11. The UN Secretary General commissioned a reporting body to assess the
UN response to the Rwandan genocide and compile a list of suggestions for how
the UN should respond to genocides in the future. Rep. of the Indep. Inquiry into
the Actions of the UN During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 53–54, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999).
12. Despite recognizing the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in Kosovo, the United Nations maintained a hands-off approach to the
conflict; as such, the Security Council continued to reaffirm its position that the
conflict should be settled peacefully pursuant to the provisions of UN Security
Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203
(Oct. 24, 1998).
13. Draft Special Rep. of the NATO Civilian Affairs Committee, Kosovo as a
Precedent: Towards a Reform of the Security Council?, NATO Doc. AS244CC-E ¶
23, (Sept. 16, 1999); see also Russia Condemns NATO at UN, BBC (Mar. 25,
1999), news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/303127.stm.
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decided to take matters into their own hands by launching air strikes
against Serbian forces.14
It’s worth noting, however, that neither NATO nor the United
States, which led the NATO operation, attempted to put forward a
formal legal justification for military intervention in Kosovo.15 The
United States and other NATO powers offered policy and
humanitarian justifications for the use of force, but in the United
States, there was a deliberate decision at the State Department Legal
Adviser’s Office to refrain from proffering a legal justification.16
Why this silence on the legal underpinnings of the Kosovo
intervention? In part, U.S. and NATO lawyers were unsure if other
states would accept any legal justification they might put forward,
and in part, they were afraid that other states would accept their logic.
That is, they didn’t want to put forward a legal theory that would be
roundly repudiated by numerous other states because that would be
embarrassing and would retard the development of any new norm
permitting humanitarian intervention—but they were equally uneasy
about the longer-term implications of creating a new norm permitting
humanitarian interventions. No one had fully thought through the
long-term repercussions of such a new norm, so at least with regard
to the law, the NATO powers decided that discretion might well be
the better part of valor. 17 In effect, they opted to leave the Kosovo
intervention in the realm of the extralegal and let history be the judge.
History in fact judged the Kosovo intervention fairly kindly.18
Though the Security Council had not authorized the military
14. See generally NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NATO,
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last updated July 15, 1999) (providing the
history of NATO’s involvement in the Kosovo conflict). Operation Allied Force
began on March 23, 1999 and lasted until July 10, 1999. Id.
15. See RAMESH THAKUR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NORMS, LAWS
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 48 (2011) (“The Clinton
administration defended NATO operations, their huge costs, and the even larger
costs of the subsequent reconstruction of Kosovo, on the argument that something
had to be done to oppose totalitarian leaders and stop ethnic cleansing and
oppression.”).
16. Id.
17. See Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo, 41
SURVIVAL 102, 120 (1999) (“[M]ost states in the international community are
nervous about justifying in advance a type of operation which might further
increase the power of major powers, and might be used against them.”).
18. See THAKUR, supra note 15, at 58–59 (“Critics of the Kosovo war must
concede the many positive accomplishments. Almost a million of Kosovo’s
displaced inhabitants returned to their homeland. Milosevic was thrown out of

166

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:161

intervention to start with, it gave what amounted to a retroactive
blessing by authorizing NATO troops to reestablish security in
Kosovo, in close coordination with the UN mission in Kosovo.19
Thus, the whole affair worked out pretty well, from a U.S. and
NATO perspective. While a question mark hovered over the issue of
legality, the issue of legitimacy seemed to have been satisfactorily
addressed.
This, of course, can be seen as a normal part of the process
through which new norms of customary international law are created.
Some States act in a certain way; other States follow suit, praise the
action, or at least refrain from criticism; influential States, such as
those on the Security Council, appear to accept the legitimacy of the
acts, and so on. While the States that formed the NATO coalition in
Kosovo did not articulate the norm of humanitarian intervention in
legal terms, one could presume that this would eventually come.20
But as I noted earlier, it’s rarely so simple or linear; rather than a
steady building of consensus, the evolution of customary
international law is often characterized by contestation and cycles of
action, reaction, counter-action and counter-reaction.
Shortly after the Kosovo intervention, Kofi Annan, then the UN
Secretary General, gave a now famous speech.21 In his speech, he
articulated the dilemma confronting the international community
after Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo.22 On the one hand, he argued, it
seems crystal clear—both morally speaking and from the perspective
of global stability perspective—that states with the ability to do
something should not merely stand by while mass slaughter takes
place.23 How could such inaction possibly be consistent with the
Kosovo . . . The credibility of NATO was preserved; the transformation of its role
from collective defence of members against attack from the outside, into the more
diffused role of peace-enforcement throughout Europe, was validated; and
Washington remains firmly anchored to Europe.”).
19. NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, supra note 14.
20. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 102–03 (noting one possible legal
justification for NATO’s involvement in Kosovo and stating that “there are some
crimes so extreme that a state responsible for them, despite the principle of
sovereignty, may properly be the subject of military intervention”).
21. Press Release, General Assembly, Secretary-General Presents His Annual
Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999)
[hereinafter Kofi Annan speech].
22. Id.
23. Id.

2014]

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: EVOLVING NORMS

167

norms that led to the creation of the UN Charter in the first place?24
Remember, the UN Charter emerged out of war, and if it was
motivated most centrally by the desire to prevent such horrific interstate conflict from recurring, it was also motivated by revulsion
against the Holocaust, revulsion against genocide, revulsion against
means and methods of warfare that killed civilians as much as
combatants, and a commitment to human dignity and human rights.25
On the other hand, Annan highlighted the dangers of permitting
states to intervene militarily in other states without Security Council
authorization.26 If doing nothing in the face of genocide offended one
key principle on which the UN Charter was premised, allowing the
unilateral use of force offended the other key principle: the
conviction that if states could decide for themselves when it’s
acceptable to use force inside other states (for reasons other than
pressing self-defense), we face a renewed risk of inter-state conflict.27
The norm of sovereign non-intervention forms a crucial part of
the UN Charter’s collective security structure, which prohibits the use
of force except when authorized by the Security Council.28 But once
you accept that sometimes it’s acceptable for one state to use armed
force inside the borders of another sovereign state for “humanitarian”
purposes, how do you prevent states from using humanitarian claims
as a pretext for interventions motivated by ideology or the desire for
domination, territory, or economic gain? Once you take the Security
Council out of the picture, what actor can evaluate claims of

24. See id. (“The inability of the international community in the case of
Kosovo to reconcile these two equally compelling interests–universal legitimacy
and effectiveness in defence of human rights–can only be viewed as a tragedy.”).
25. Id.
26. Id. (suggesting that the humanitarian response must be applied fairly and
consistently regardless of region, that intervention must be treated as a last resort,
that the international community must redefine the meaning of a “national interest,”
and that the Security Council must be capable of responding to the conflict before a
decision to intervene via a military engagement can be made).
27. See id. (“The choice, as I said during the Kosovo conflict, must not be
between Council unity and inaction in the face of genocide–as in the case of
Rwanda, on the one hand; and Council division, and regional action, as in the case
of Kosovo, on the other. In both cases, the Member States of the United Nations
should have been able to find common ground in upholding the principles of the
Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity.”).
28. Id. (“The Charter requires the Council to be the defender of the common
interest, and unless it is seen to be so—in an era of human rights, interdependence,
and globalization—there is a danger that others could seek to take its place.”).
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humanitarian crisis and decide which interventions would be
justified, and which would be pretextual?
Since then, the international community has continued to
struggle with the challenge posed by humanitarian intervention. In
September 1999, for instance, the Security Council passed Resolution
1265 on the protection of civilians in times of armed conflict.29 This
was significant, in the sense that it was the first time that the Security
Council explicitly declared that it saw itself not only as the guarantor
of peace between states, but as a guarantor of civilian protection even
in times of internal armed conflicts.30 In Resolution 1265, the
Council “[e]xpresse[d] its willingness to respond to situations of
armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian
assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including
through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council’s
disposal in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”31
That may sound anodyne, but in the language of the United Nations,
it was a huge shift: it brought matters once considered “internal” to
member states into the Security Council’s declared ambit, and the
reference to “appropriate measures” was understood by all to signal a
willingness on the part of the Council to authorize the use of armed
force, if needed, for humanitarian protection purposes.32
Meanwhile, efforts continued to find a way out of the dilemma
articulated by Kofi Annan in 1999. Most notably, the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was
established.33 ICISS consisted of noted scholars, diplomats, and
former high-level officials, and in November of 2001, ICISS

29. S.C. Res. 1265, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999).
30. Id. ¶ 10.
31. Id.
32. Carol Weil, The Protection-Neutrality Dilemma in Humanitarian
Emergencies: Why the Need for Military Intervention?, INT’L MIGRATION REV. 79,
86–87 (2001).
33. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT VII (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT];
THAKUR, supra note 15, at 75 (“Under the impact of contrasting experiences in
Rwanda and Kosovo, Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged member states to
come up with a new consensus on the competing visions of national and popular
sovereignty. Responding to the challenge, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy set up the ICISS to wrestle with the whole gamut of difficult and
complex issues involved in the debate.”).
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published a report called “The Responsibility to Protect.”34 In this
report, ICISS did something smart, novel and in many ways
extraordinarily appealing. In effect, the ICISS report sought to get out
of the supposed dilemma between the moral pull of humanitarian
intervention and the moral pull of sovereignty by simply redefining
the terms of the discussion.35
In particular, ICISS sought to redefine sovereignty itself: to
ICISS, sovereignty is not something that states possess simply by
virtue of being states. ICISS took the view that sovereignty is a
matter of responsibilities as much as rights, and the most fundamental
responsibility of a sovereign State is the protection of its own
population.36 The right to be free of external intervention—long
considered a fundamental attribute of Westphalian sovereignty—is,
to ISICC, contingent upon a state’s ongoing ability to protect its own
population.37 A state that cannot (or will not) protect its population
loses, to that same extent, the sovereign privilege on nonintervention.38
ICISS went a step further, arguing that if a state doesn’t fulfill its
responsibility to protect its own population, the international
community has the responsibility to step in and do something if a
state fails to fulfill its responsibility.39 That external intervention can

34. ICISS REPORT, supra note 33.
35. See id. at 17 (noting the evolution the “right to intervene” concept and
redefining it as “the responsibility to protect”). The ICCIS defined the
responsibility to protect in terms of three inherent concepts: 1) evaluation of the
issues from the point of view of those in need of support; 2) acknowledgment that
the primary responsibility to protect rests with the state concerned, and that other
states may intervene only when the state itself is unwilling or unable to fulfill this
responsibility or is the perpetrator; and 3) the responsibility to protect includes the
responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Id.
36. See id. at 13 (stating that acceptance into the UN re-characterizes the idea
of sovereignty into one where the state becomes responsible for its citizens and
their welfare, including both the state’s own citizens and those in the international
community).
37. Id. at 17 (“The Commission believes that responsibility to protect resides
first and foremost with the state whose people are directly affected. This fact
reflects not only international law and the modern state system, but also the
practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive difference.”).
38. Id.
39. See THAKUR, supra note 15, at 79 (“But if [the state] should default, a
residual, fallback responsibility also lies with the broader community of states.
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure and the government in question is unwilling
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take many, many forms, of course, and ICISS was quick to note that
most manifestations of the international community’s responsibility
to protect would and should not be military in nature.40 They could be
economic interventions (sanctions, foreign aid); they could be
diplomatic efforts; they could involve various forms of technical
assistance, and so on.41 But as a last resort—and subject to the
standard just war principles of right intention, reasonable prospects of
success, etc.—the international community could turn to armed
intervention if needed to protect civilian populations.42
Two things are worth noting here. One, note how neatly ICISS
avoided the dilemma articulated by Kofi Annan in 1999: Annan
articulated a conflict between norms of sovereignty and norms of
humanitarianism;43 ICISS simply redefined sovereignty to avoid the
conflict altogether. To ICISS, sovereignty does not stand opposed to
humanitarian intervention; on the contrary, the most fundamental
responsibilities of sovereignty revolve around humanitarian
protection considerations.44
Second, it’s important to note that ICISS saw the Security
Council as an important but not utterly essential arbiter. While the
2001 ICISS report stated clearly that it was the Security Council that
should evaluate whether a military intervention was justified by a
state’s failure to protect its population, the report also warned that in
particularly compelling and egregious situations, states might well be
justified in bypassing a paralyzed Security Council.45
Normatively, this makes sense: if the legitimacy of states
themselves rests upon their individual and collective ability to protect
the human beings who populate them, then surely the legitimacy of a
group of states—the Security Council for instance—also similarly
rests on that ability to protect human beings from egregious and
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect.”).
40. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 33, at 29 (“These coercive measures may
include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases – but only
extreme cases – they may also include military action.”).
41. Id. at 29–31 (outlining the Commission’s stance on non-military
interventions as part of the international responsibility to protect).
42. Id. at 31–32.
43. Kofi Annan Speech, supra note 21.
44. ICISS REPORT, supra note 33, at 13.
45. Id. at 54–55.
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massive harm. By implication, if the Security Council is incapable of
taking action to protect populations under threat, it is, to that same
extent, delegitimized, and states opting to take matters into their own
hands may do so.
The arguments made by ICISS were both novel and powerful,46
but the ICISS report came at an inopportune moment for proponents
of humanitarian intervention. The September 11 attacks preceded the
release of the ICISS report by just two months, and the heated
debates about humanitarian intervention that bedeviled the
international community for the previous few years were instantly
displaced by a new set of concerns about terrorism.47 In this sense,
the timing of the ICISS report could not have been worse.
That said, the events of 9/11—and the international community’s
response—could also be viewed as offering further (albeit indirect)
support for ICISS’s “responsibility to protect” theory and for its
understanding of sovereignty. 9/11 illustrated the growing difficulty
in defining the realm of activities that was purely “internal” to a state,
versus the realm of issues that can be regarded as purely “external.”
While ICISS articulated the responsibility to protect as triggered by a
state’s sustained failure to protect its own population, 9/11
demonstrated the harms that could result if a state’s failure to control
its “internal” affairs led to the “export” of harm to the populations of
other states.48 Consider Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda. The
Afghan state was unable or unwilling to prevent its territory from
being used to export massive harm to other populations outside of
Afghanistan—in the form of the thousands of Americans and others
injured or killed in the 9/11 attacks.49

46. See THAKUR, supra note 15, at 85 (“At a seminar in New York on 15
February 2002, organized by the International Peace Academy, most Security
Council members seemed supportive of the main thrust of the Report.”).
47. See Thomas G. Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit, 24 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 74, 747–48 (2006) (discussing the “more important preoccupations in the
aftermath of 9/11”).
48. See Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Report of the Committee of
Experts on Nation Rebuilding in Afghanistan, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 709, 711
(2002) (“And in response to the September 11 attacks, most states have heightened
concerns relating to the export of terrorism from Afghanistan.”).
49. See Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN AFF.
127, 128 (2002) (arguing that many failed states are incapable of effectively
governing within their own borders, becoming a breeding ground for instability and
a troubling situation for world order).
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In certain senses, then, the immediate post 9/11 period was an
opportune moment to advance a new theory of sovereignty. The
ICISS emphasis on the responsibility of states to prevent harm to
their own populations dovetailed nicely with the post-9/11
insistence—articulated both by the US and by the Security Council
itself—that states had a responsibility to prevent the export of harm
to the populations of other states (e.g., by harboring terrorists).
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere,50 many of the post 9/11 U.S.
arguments for the use of force for counterterrorism purposes parallel
Responsibility to Protect arguments. Both rest on a similar, though
sometimes unarticulated, theory of sovereignty as being a matter
more of privileges and responsibilities rather than rights, and as being
“waivable” if a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities. In a superficial
sense, “responsibility to protect” arguments for humanitarian
intervention and arguments justifying the use of military force to
fight terrorism might seem a world apart. On a deeper structural
level, however, they complement each other, and each legitimizes the
other.51
But the action/reaction cycle continued, as events in the years
after 9/11 began to complicate nascent support for the “responsibility
to protect” norm articulated first by ICISS. Most significantly, in
2003, the United States invaded Iraq.52 As you know, the Security
Council had not authorized the invasion (though some made the
rather tortured argument that the invasion could be justified via the
ongoing effect of several pre-9/11 resolutions).53 The invasion was
50. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, An Ambiguous Legacy: Lessons for International
Law from the Arab Spring, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 713 (2013).
51. See ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT
TO END MASS ATROCITIES 33 (2009) [hereinafter BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT] (“The whole concept of the R2P rests on the idea that sovereignty and
human rights are two sides of the same coin, and not opposing principles locked in
interminable struggle, as is often portrayed.”).
52. Authorization for the Use of Force against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107−243, 116
Stat. 1498 (2002).
53. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (“Recalling that
its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant
resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace
and security in the area.”); S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29,
1990) (authorizing Member States to “use all necessary means to uphold and
implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area”); S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc.
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mainly premised on a legal theory justifying acts of “preemptive selfdefense,” the notion being that while Saddam Hussein had not yet
used the weapons of mass destruction he allegedly possessed, he
might at any time use them against the United States, and the United
States was therefore justified in taking preemptive action to eliminate
the threat.54 But within a few years, it became clear that rationale for
the invasion of Iraq had relied, at best, on a misunderstanding or
exaggeration of the nature of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s
regime.55 At worst, and in the eyes of many around the world, the
invasion was based simply on a deliberate effort to misinform both
the American public and the world.56
To the international community, the U.S. invasion of Iraq served
as a powerful reminder of the dangers of permitting States to use
force without Security Council authorization, and undermined
structurally
similar
arguments
addressing
humanitarian
57
intervention. In the case of the Kosovo intervention, the legitimate
ends (stopping the ethnic cleansing that was undeniably underway)
were accepted by most states as justifying the essentially extra-legal

S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) (determining that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq is a
“breach of international peace and security” and supporting “all efforts” to resolve
situation); see also CORNELIU BJOLA, LEGITIMISING THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 135 (2009) (“Far from clarifying the issue, Resolution
1441 . . . muddied the waters even more. . . . The Security Council officially
recognized that Iraq was in material breach of the terms of the 1991 cease-fire, but
it refused to authorize the use of force to redress the situation.”).
54. See BJOLA, supra note 53, at 122 (underscoring the rarity of a major power
engaging in military action against another country for preventative reasons); Alex
J. Bellamy, Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 14 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 135, 146 (2008) [hereinafter Bellamy, Conflict Prevention] (“To
make matters worse, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was portrayed as an exercise of
preventive war ⎯ particularly by Vice-President Dick Cheney.”).
55. S. REP. NO. 108−301, at 14 (2004) (finding that the Intelligence
Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq’s Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” mischaracterized the intelligence
through overstatement and lack of support).
56. See James P. Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His
Arguments for War with Iraq? 34 PRES. STUD. Q. 25, 25−26 (2004) (concluding that
the Bush Administration’s “claims about Iraq’s nuclear capacity were based on
dubious evidence that was presented in a misleading manner”).
57. See Bellamy, Conflict Prevention, supra note 54, at 144 (arguing that the
international community, particularly those states likely to be on the receiving end
of preventative measures, worried that a broader license for intervention could be
used to serve the self-interests of powerful nations).

174

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:161

means (the use of force without Security Council authorization).58
Perhaps the same might have happened in Iraq. It’s one of history’s
many “what ifs”: what if the United States had ousted Saddam
Hussein, but had not pushed through de-Baathification and had not
disbanded the Iraqi army? What if the U.S. invasion had produced a
genuinely stable, peaceful, and democratic Iraq? Perhaps, in those
circumstances, the international community might have been
prepared to overlook the evidence demonstrating that Iraq had never
possessed weapons of mass destruction. But that’s not what
happened: the U.S. military intervention was not only justified based
on misinformation, but was generally perceived as having done more
harm than good both for the Iraqi people and for regional stability.59
For several years, the Iraq fiasco powerfully discredited other kinds
of arguments about military intervention.60
But time passes, and again the pendulum swung back—at least
for a time. President George W. Bush was succeeded by President
Barack Obama, who, at least during his presidential campaign, was
sharply critical of Bush era doctrines of preemptive armed conflict
and associated attitudes towards military intervention.61 Obama
promised to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq and bring the conflict in
Afghanistan to a responsible end, and these promises eased the
concerns of many in the international community.62 Even as thencandidate Obama repudiated the Bush doctrine of preemptive self58. See Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in
Kosovo, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 301 (2000) (noting that within the NATO
states there was discussion and agreement to intervene to stop the brutal expulsion
and atrocities, while no single legal justification was satisfactory); but see BJOLA,
supra note 53, at 132 (arguing that the legal basis for the Iraq invasion was slightly
stronger than for Kosovo, due to the fact that the Iraqi regime had breached or
ignored several UN resolutions adopted after the 1991 Gulf War).
59. See BJOLA supra note 53, at 131 (arguing that while one of the major
reasons for the invasion of Iraq was to stabilize the area, the invasion actually
helped to stimulate a large network of local and foreign insurgents into a “welldeveloped terrorist network”).
60. See BELLAMY, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 51, at 68
(“[C]onstructive debate about the R2P was hampered by the US-led invasion of
Iraq”); Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to
Doctrine – But What of Implementation?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 293 (2006).
61. Barack Obama, Speech on Iraq (Oct. 12, 2007) (transcript available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/12/21/obama.trans.iraq/).
62. 153 CONG. REC. S709, 722−23 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Barack Obama).
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defense, other influential members in his administration—such as
Samantha Power and Susan Rice—publicly embraced the
Responsibility to Protect, and began to aggressively push it at the
United Nations level, urging the Security Council to reference and
endorse the concept.63
They succeeded, in part as a result of a burst of international
good will towards the new Obama administration, and reduced
suspicion of the United States internationally.64 The Security Council
made positive reference to the responsibility to protect in several
resolutions,65 and the concept reached its apotheosis in March of
2011, when the Security Council authorizing the use of force to
protect civilians both in Libya (where NATO took the lead) and in
Cote d’Ivoire (where UN peacekeepers assisted by French troops
used force to restore civil order following post-election violence).66
In both cases, the Council expressly invoked the Responsibility to
Protect.67
This was the high water point for the R2P norm.68 After Libya
and Cote D’Ivoire, there was a brief period in which numerous
commentators declared that R2P had finally “grown up,” achieving,
63. See Susan E. Rice, The Genocide in Darfur: America Must do More to
Fulfill the Responsibility to Protect, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, (2007)
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2007/10/24darfur%20ric
e%20Opp08/PB_Darfur_Rice.PDF; Samantha Power, Why the Movement Needs
Help: The Void, NEW REPUBLIC 16–18 (May 15, 2006), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/20060515_Power_TheVoid.pdf (suggesting
that the key to protecting Darfur from continued genocide is for the United States
to mobilize and deploy a large force of peacekeepers). But cf. Samantha Power,
How to Stop Genocide in Iraq: Offering the Carrot of U.S. Withdrawal May be the
Best Way to End Ethnic Cleansing in Iraq, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2007)
http://www.latimes.com/news/la-oe-power5mar05,0,114719.story#axzz2zjgUYvsx
(suggesting that warnings of atrocity are misused by people wanting to justify their
mistaken support for the war in Iraq).
64. See Peter Baker, Good Will, but Few Foreign Policy Benefits for Obama,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2009, at A18.
65. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C.
Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30,
2011); S.C. Res. 1996, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1996 (July 8, 2011); S.C. Res. 2014, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/2014 (Oct. 21, 2011).
66. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 65; S.C. Res. 1975, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Gareth Evans, Responsible Protection: Building a Safer World, China
Institute of International Studies Conference (Oct. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Evans,
Responsible Protection].
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or certainly getting within spitting distance, the status of a norm of
customary international law.69
That period lasted only about three months, however.70 Within
months, the Libya intervention began to appear at least to critics more
like a regime change intervention than a civilian protection
intervention.71 Perhaps this was inevitable: it’s not clear how an
intervention intended to protect civilians from predation by their own
government could avoid morphing into a regime change intervention
in the face of continued government attacks on civilians.
Regardless, the NATO shift towards a straightforward attack on
Libyan government forces triggered anxiety and anger in many states,
including, most notably, Russia, China, and South Africa.72 In their
eyes, the United States had arguably tricked the Security Council into
authorizing force for a limited, humanitarian purpose—and had then
quickly moved to depose a sitting government.73 Even if the United
States and other NATO powers had not initially intended the
intervention to expand, argued critics, the conflict in illustrated that
using force for civilian protection purposes could easily end up
having unintended consequences.74

69. Id.; see also, e.g., Gareth Evans, Responding to Mass Atrocity Crimes: The
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) After Libya and Syria, Public Lecture at the Central
European School of Public Policy (Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Evans, Central
European University Lecture] (“It was not until 2011 that the UN Security Council
itself took coercive action explicitly invoking R2P. But when it did so, in the cases
of Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, this was widely heralded–including by me–as the
coming of age of the responsibility to protect.”).
70. Evans, Central European University Lecture, supra note 69.
71. Id.; see also Solomon A. Dersso, The African Union, in AN INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 220, 242 (Gentian Zyberi & Kevin
T. Mason eds., 2013) (suggesting that the way in which Security Council
Resolution 1973 was executed further heightened the concerns that civilian
protection was just a pretext for a regime change).
72. Evans, Central European University Lecture, supra note 69.
73. Louis Charbonneau, Russia U.N. Veto on Syria Aimed at Crushing West’s
Crusade, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/usun-russia-idUSTRE8170BK20120208.
74. See Evans, Responsible Protection, supra note 68 (suggesting that an
unintended consequence in the wake of the Libyan intervention is the extreme
difficulty to gain un-vetoed authorization by the UN Security Council for the future
use of force for civilian protection, due in large part to the mistrust of United
States, United Kingdom, and France by the BRICS nations).
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So the pendulum once again swung away from norms favoring
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect and
towards an insistence on sovereign non-intervention—or, at the very
least, a deep wariness of interventionist arguments. This is reflected
in the UN debate about Syria, where, despite some 150,000 deaths,
the Security Council has been unwilling even to use “responsibility to
protect” terminology in connection with the conflict.75
In the United States, President Obama seems to have taken this
to heart, as evidenced by his conflicted response to events in Syria.76
President Obama has made it clear he has no appetite for a unilateral
humanitarian intervention intended to protect civilians; inside sources
suggest that he is as concerned about slippery slopes as any U.S.
critic.77 In August and September of 2013, however, Obama—
trapped by his own rhetorical declaration that the use of chemical
weapons in Syria would cross a U.S. “red line”—briefly declared his
willingness to use military force for the limited purpose of ending the
Assad regime’s ability to use chemical weapons against his citizens.78
In the process, he articulated a legal argument justifying the potential
unilateral use of force for the purpose of protecting civilians, even in
75. Id.
76. Compare President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the White
House Press Corps. (Aug. 20, 2012) [hereinafter President Obama, Press Corps
Remarks] (“I have, at this point, not ordered military engagement in the situation.
….In a situation this volatile, I wouldn’t say that I am absolutely confident. What
I’m saying is we’re monitoring that situation carefully. We have put together a
range of contingency plans.”), with Mark Landler et al., Obama Set for Limited
Strike on Syria as British Vote No, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/politics/obama-syria.html (reporting that
President Obama was going ahead with plans for a limited military strike against
Syria, despite the rejection of a strike by the British people and mounting questions
from U.S. Congress).
77. Frederik Pleitgen & Tom Cohen, ‘War-Weary’ Obama Says Syria
Chemical
Attack
Requires
Response,
CNN
(Aug.
30,
2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/30/world/europe/syria-civil-war/
(reporting
that
President Obama has declared himself “war-weary,” and would prefer to build a
coalition of strong NATO allies).
78. President Obama, Press Corps Remarks, supra note 76 (“We have been
very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red
line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or
being utilized.”); President Barack Obama, News Conference by the President
(Apr. 30, 2013) (“[W]hat I’ve also said is that the use of chemical weapons would
be a game-changer not simply for the United States but for the international
community. . . . And what we now have is evidence that chemical weapons have
been used inside Syria, but we don’t know how they were used, when they were
used, who used them.”).
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the absence of Security Council authorization.79 The United
Kingdom’s prime minister did the same, asserting explicitly that a
humanitarian intervention would be lawful under the circumstances.80
In the United States, the United Kingdom and France, key
surrogates—such as former U.S. State Department Legal Advisor
Harold Koh—also advanced arguments justifying a potential U.S.
intervention in Syria.81
These arguments were far from universally accepted.82 The
response both from domestic U.S. constituencies and even many
close U.S. allies was sharply critical.83 The British parliament
declined to authorize British participation in any use of force in
Syria,84 and in the United States, it seems quite likely than Congress

79. See John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Statement on Syria (Aug. 30,
2013) (emphasizing the Administration’s focus on a U.S. intervention in Syria on
national and collective security grounds, due to the intelligence information
supporting use of banned chemical weapons by Syria; citing signed agreements
such as the START Treaty, the New START Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons
Convention; citing the “guaranteed Russian obstructionism” in the UN Security
Council; and stating that action taken by the U.S. would be “limited and tailored”).
80. Syria Crisis: David Cameron Makes Case for Military Action, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23883427.
81. See, e.g., Harold Koh, Strike on Syria for Chemical Weapons–Not Illegal,
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2013), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/strikesyria-chemical-weapons-%25E2%2580%2593-not-illegal.
82. See Colum Lynch, U.N. Chief Ban Ki-moon Warns G-20 Leaders Against
Possible Military Action in Syria, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/world/national-security/un-chief-ban-ki-moon-warns-g-20-leadersagainst-possible-military-action-in-syria/2013/09/06/040b6fd8-1711-11e3-a2ecb47e45e6f8ef_print.html (“U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and his top Syria
mediator sharply but indirectly criticized potential U.S. military strikes against
Syria, saying any additional use of force could exacerbate the country’s civil war
while violating international law.”).
83. Krishnadev Calamur, Where U.S. Allies Stand on a Strike Against Syria,
NPR (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:16 PM) http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/08/30/21
7189600/where-u-s-allies-stand-on-a-strike-against-syria (reporting that while the
U.K. Prime Minister strongly supported intervention, Parliament vetoed the vote;
Germany stated it would support intervention but would not take part; and the
Italian foreign minister stated that an intervention without a UN mandate could turn
into a “global conflagration”).
84. Nicholas Watt & Nick Hopkins, Cameron Forced to Rule out British
Attack on Syria After MPs Reject Motion, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2013, 6:07
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/29/cameron-british-attack-syria
-mps.

2014]

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: EVOLVING NORMS

179

would have done the same.85 Ultimately, they were not put to the test,
as the United States opted against military action when Syria’s
government agreed to surrender its chemical weapons under
international supervision.86
There’s an interesting irony here: the legal case for unilateral
humanitarian intervention was articulated most explicitly by several
powerful states at the very moment support for a norm permitting
such interventions was at its weakest in many other states. On the one
hand, the Syria debate saw three permanent members of the Security
Council go well beyond previous expressions of support for the
responsibility to protect and explicitly embrace the view that
humanitarian interventions are lawful even in the absence of Security
Council authorization. On the other hand, the Syria debate also
shored up opposition to norms permitting humanitarian intervention,
as Russia, China, and other states weighed in to express their
opposition.
To put it a little differently, norms supporting military
intervention
for
humanitarian
purposes—even
unilateral
intervention—have evolved substantially in the last two decades,
both as a result of the 2001 ICISS report and as a result of the
subsequent embrace of the responsibility to protect by the United
States and other influential states. But even as norms supporting
humanitarian intervention have been articulated, elaborated, and
placed on a firmer theoretical and legal footing, becoming linked to
changing norms about sovereignty more generally, the international
consensus supporting such humanitarian interventions is in greater
disarray than at any time since the end of the Cold War.87
So where are we now, given this cycle of action, reaction, and
counter-reaction: Do we have a norm of customary international law
permitting humanitarian intervention, or not? And what does the
future hold? What does the ongoing debate about interventions tell us
about the world in which we live?
85. See Mark Landler & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Delays Syria Strike to
Focus on a Russia Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at A1 (“The president said he
had asked Congressional leaders to postpone a vote authorizing military action—a
vote he was almost certain to lose. . . .”).
86. Id.
87. Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect in Action, 74 COURIER 4, 5
(2012) (arguing that the paralysis of the Security Council to act regarding Syria
partially results from Russian “realpolitik,” push back from the BRICS regarding
the NATO-led coalition in Libya overstepping its UN mandate, and the United
States, United Kingdom, and France pushing for R2P solution).
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On the first question, I think the honest answer is that customary
international law remains in disarray on this subject. It would be
going too far—after Kosovo, after the Syria debate—to assert that
customary international law clearly prohibits any and all
humanitarian interventions undertaken without Security Council
blessing. But it would also be going too far to assert that such
interventions are clearly permitted under customary international law.
The law is unsettled and likely to remain so for the foreseeable
future.
This shouldn’t surprise us. In many ways, the debate about
humanitarian intervention is both part of and a symbol of a broader
struggle to understand what sovereignty can possibly mean in a
globalized era. These days, it’s impossible to draw clear lines
between the internal and the external–the foreign and the domestic.88
What can sovereignty mean, in an era in which “internal” civil
conflict easily spills beyond borders, and in which modern
communications technologies—Twitter, YouTube, and so on—make
the moral impact of conflict global and immediate? Looked at
through the lens of economics or climate or public health, borders are
increasingly meaningless, and states have less and less ability to
function autonomously. (In some ways, all states today intervene
constantly in the internal affairs of all other states, whether they know
it or not—and even whether they like it or not).89
From a security perspective, too, traditional conceptions of
sovereignty have been undermined: as the 9/11 attacks made clear,
what happens in Afghanistan (or Mali or Yemen) cannot be expected
to stay in Afghanistan (or Mali or Yemen).90 Lethal harm can be
exported across borders more rapidly—and by an ever-widening
range of non-state actors—than ever before.
88. See James Crawford, Sovereignty as Legal Value, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 121 (James Crawford and Martti
Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
89. See Tom Hadden & Colin J. Harvey, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The
Law of Internal Crisis and Conflict, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS (Mar. 31,
1999),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jpt4.htm
(“There is an increasing expectation of intervention by external States and
voluntary agencies to protect and relieve the suffering of those affected by internal
crises and conflict.”).
90. See Rotberg, supra note 49, at 128 (“Failed states have come to be feared
as ‘breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder’ (in the words of
political scientist Stephen Walt), as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror.”).
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Indeed, it’s no coincidence that arguments about the use of force
for counterterrorism purposes are structurally similar to arguments
about the responsibility to protect. If a state’s inability or
unwillingness to protect its own population makes it subject to
external intervention for the purpose of population protection, why
shouldn’t a state’s inability or unwillingness to protect other states’
populations from the consequences of activities inside its borders
render it similarly subject to external intervention? (Note that this is
not the same as traditional arguments justifying the use of force in
national self-defense, though it overlaps with such arguments. The
theory of sovereignty that undergirds the responsibility to protect
offers an alternative logic justifying intervention. A logic that, taken
to its extreme, would allow states considering military intervention to
bypass traditional requirements of imminence and use force even
when the threats are directed at third-party states).
I find myself actually profoundly ambivalent about all this. The
arguments that have emerged in favor of the responsibility to
protect—and indeed, for counterterrorism-based interventions—have
a tremendous amount of moral legitimacy to them in this globalized
world. At the same time, however inadequate we may find traditional
conceptions of sovereignty, sovereignty is one of the sole bulwarks
against a renewed era of interstate conflict. Because Kofi Annan’s
1999 warnings still ring true: once you open up the door to unilateral
military intervention—once you have a norm permitting a single state
to decide for itself when a situation justifies the use of armed force—
what will prevent a slide back towards the kind of dangerous free-forall the UN Charter was designed to prevent?
This is where we are right now, and we don’t have the
answer to that dilemma. In an ideal sense, the way out of this
dilemma lies in developing more robust, responsive and accountable
forms of international governance. That’s the logic of the situation in
which we find ourselves: in the age of globalization, we need, more
than ever, an empowered global referee committed both to stability
and to human dignity—a global referee that can make these difficult
decisions about when and where to use force, so it’s not just one
state’s views against another’s.
We don’t, of course, have anything close to this more robust
system of international governance right now. We should surely
strive for it—it is surely in the ultimate interest of all states. How else
can we prevent the (perhaps inevitable) erosion of traditional norms
of sovereignty from leading to a slide towards conflict and
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instability? How else can we address urgent collective problems such
as climate change?
I’m not particularly optimistic that we will get there,
however. In the not-so-distant past, we humans have demonstrated a
remarkable incapacity to make clearly necessary changes
incrementally and peacefully. Think of the major inflection points in
international law: the Peace of Westphalia, or the post World War II
creation of the UN Charter system. The bursts of creativity and
change symbolized by the emergence of the Westphalian order or the
UN system did not emerge out of peaceful collaboration between
States.91 On the contrary, these dramatic changes in the international
system arose out of cataclysm. The religious wars that wracked
Europe before the Peace of Westphalia left nearly a third of the
population dead in parts of Central Europe.92 World Wars I and II
were nearly as devastating, leaving tens of millions dead and many of
Europe’s great cities in ruins.93
There is nothing inevitable about progress (in the
international domain or any other domain). Perhaps today’s
international system will gradually and peacefully morph into a more
powerful, equitable, and effective system of global governance—but
perhaps it won’t. Perhaps instead the current system will collapse as
catastrophically as the pre-World War II international order.
Change is inevitable, but it not inevitably for the better; even
when the ultimate outcome is good, the process of change may be
neither pleasant nor gentle. We think of the post World War II UN
Charter system as “better” that the rules and institutions that preceded
it—but that “better” system could only be built on the ruins of the old
system.
It will take a concerted effort and a whole lot of luck for us
to stagger and stumble our way towards a stronger, more stable, and
91. See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of
Sovereignty, 21 INT’L HIST. REV. 569, 582 (1999) (citing the discord in which the
Peace of Westphalia emerged, particularly the haggling over precedence at Münster
as “legendary” and the repeated attempts and failures of the French and Swedish
embassies to meet and negotiate in 1644).
92. THOMAS H. GREER & GAVIN LEWIS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 398 (2005).
93. WWI Casualty and Death Tables, PBS (last visited Feb. 8, 2014),
http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html (listing total deaths
during WWI at over 8.5 million).
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more human rights friendly international system. If we don’t have
that much luck, and we may very well not, we would easily find
ourselves back in a situation of very substantial global instability and
conflict.
This is the central insight I struggle to communicate when I
teach international law. We all have such a “presentist” bias. We
assume that today’s weather is the best predictor of tomorrow’s
weather, and statistically, so it is: tomorrow’s weather is
overwhelmingly likely to resemble today’s weather. Until the day it
doesn’t, that is. Similarly, we assume that tomorrow, the international
order will probably look a whole lot like it looks today. And this will
also be true, right up to the day when it’s not.
Think of it like this: none of our intelligence agencies predicted
the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the Arab Spring and the rapid
ouster of several Middle Eastern despots, for that matter.94 Systems
can seem very stable, but the fact that a system has not yet collapsed
doesn’t mean it’s in a state of equilibrium.95 Unstable systems can
persist for long periods then collapse very suddenly.96
This, then, is the central challenge for those of you who care
about international law: we inhabit an unstable international order
premised on increasingly contested norms. Can we do anything to
ensure the resiliency and adaptability of the current system—can we
help nudge it towards something more responsive and robust? Or will
we just watch in dismay as it falls to pieces around us?

94. See Uri Friedman, The Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 3, 2012) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/1/3/the_
ten_biggest_american_intelligence_failures; Ken Dilanian, U.S. Intelligence
Official Acknowledges Missed Arab Spring Signs, L.A. TIMES (July 19, 2012, 2:23
PM) http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/07/us-intelligence-officialacknowledges-missed-signs-ahead-of-arab-spring-.html.
95. See Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, WASH. Q.,
85, 91−92 (2002) (noting, for instance, that Sri Lanka, where 80 percent of the
population believes the government performs reasonably well and there has been
“robust” levels of economic performance since the 1990s, has still be engrossed in
a civil war for over twenty years and, while not collapsed, remains a weakened
state).
96. See, e.g., id. at 93 (“Zimbabwe is an example of a once unquestionably
strong African state–indeed, one of the strongest–that has fallen rapidly through
weakness to the very edge of failure.”).

